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Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi∗ 
Introduction 
Islamic banking and finance can be described as a system through which 
finance is provided in the form of money in return for either equity or rights 
to share in future business profits, or in the form of goods and services 
delivered in return for a commitment to repay their value at a future date. 
By now, a good deal of intellectual effort has been undertaken by a 
number of specialists in Islamic economics to explore different aspects of 
Islamic banking and finance. Even some conventional economists, 
intentionally or unintentionally, have dealt with the subjects, which may be 
considered closely akin to it. It is an undeniable fact that Islamic financial 
institutions have had only a marginal existence during the last 300 years. They 
did not get the same chance as western financial institutions to gradually 
evolve their institutional structure, tools and modus operandi to their full 
potential. Therefore, such evolutionary process of Islamic banking and 
finance must be done through serious intellectual work by economists rather 
than observing institutions at work. However, Islamic banking and finance 
has now been in the arena for more than a quarter of a century. It has taken a 
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contemporary shape. Whether it has sufficiently approached the Islamic 
paradigm par excellence or not, is a different question.  
The philosophy of Islamic banking and finance is a set of theories and ideas 
related to its understanding.1 In this regard, we must first start with the rules 
of Islamic Shari[ah from which the very idea of Islamic banking has been 
drawn. Second, monetary and macro theory is required to explain why Islam 
considers dealing through the rate of interest as totally unacceptable, and the 
economy-wide consequences of such practice. Third, banking theory itself 
would be necessary to figure out the behavior of Islamic banking and finance 
as well as to assess its comparative performance. 
2. Shari[ah 
Islamic teachings in the fields of mu[amalat, or transactions, prohibit 
selling a certain quantity of any present goods or service for a different 
(presumably larger) quantity of the same good or/and service delivered in the 
future. This is understood to apply to money as well as to all other goods and 
services. As a result, any amount of present money cannot be exchanged for a 
larger amount of money in future. In addition, there are other rules of 
transactions that must be applied to insure fairness of dealing to both the 
contracting parties concerned. Mainly al-ghabn2 and al-gharar3 are strictly 
prohibited. 
3. Monetary and Macro Theory 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, most economists found no 
fault with the fact that the present banking and financial system is interest-
based. In the mid sixties of the last century, some economists noticed that the 
current macroeconomic theory is devoid of any satisfactory and acceptable 
rationale for holding money. As a result of this realization, attempts were 
made to introduce money explicitly into theory, while building the micro 
foundations of macroeconomics. During such process, it was natural to look 
into the issue of optimal monetary policies. Only then, they stumbled on the 
Friedman’s monetary rule that a zero nominal interest rate is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for optimal allocative efficiency.4 In a fiat-money world, 
adding one marginal unit of real balances costs no real resources to the 
community. Imposing a positive price on the use of money would lead 
traders to economize on its use, by using real resources. However, when the 
rate of interest is zero, traders will have no incentive to substitute real 
resources for money. More real resources can therefore be directed to 
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consumption and investment. These results imply that the long forgotten 
Christian and Jewish teachings as well as those of Islam and Hinduism that 
prohibit the charge of interest on loans are not an aberration. 
In a conventional market economy the rate of interest can be brought 
down to zero only through deflating the economy at a rate equal to the real 
rate of interest, which can be attained by steadily contracting the money 
supply at a rate equal to the representative household time preference.5 Such 
policy rule clearly implies that central bankers should implement a long-run 
policy of deflation, something that they would never accept.6 
With deflating the economy, some economists would worry about the 
existence of a liquidity trap when the rate of interest is zero.7 Other 
economists advise to exercise deflationary policies only asymptotically in 
order to apply the Friedman’s Rule.8 Others point out that monetary 
authorities would have less leeway with adjusting the interest rate downwards 
in the face of recession9 if the rate of interest is very low. Certainly, deflation 
has efficiency problems parallel to those of inflation, even at very low interest 
rates.10 While many economists believe that problems involved with zero 
interest rates are all surmountable, monetary authorities are not yet 
impressed.11  
The fact that Islamic banking and finance avoids the use of interest-based 
lending has significant implications to monetary policy. In managing the 
money supply, the monetary authority would monitor the real rate of growth 
and set the rate of monetary expansion to the level consistent with price 
stability and expected real growth. Some Islamic economists propose a 100 
per cent required reserve ratio in order to give the authorities absolute control 
of the money supply and to appropriate all seigniorage resulting from 
monetary expansion to the government instead of banks’ shareholders.12 The 
fact that the economy is as close as possible to price stability implies that the 
rate of monetary growth is optimal, and there is no need to divert real 
resources to monetary use. Therefore, Pareto optimality is assured without 
problematic deflationary policies. 
Meanwhile, people can use their cash balances to carry out spot 
purchases. Those with insufficient cash balances for their current purchases 
of assets and/or commodities can revert to finance. The rate of interest is 
replaced by the rate of profit on equity and profit-sharing finance, by 
markups on credit-purchase finance and by rental rates on leasing finance. 
While the time-value of money is maintained, there is no need to handle the 
complicated questions of how to bring the rate of interest down to zero in 
order to reach the optimal allocation of resources. 
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In case of profit sharing modes of Islamic finance, focus would be on the 
profitability and rate of return of the concerned investment. Financial 
resources would be directed to the most productive investments. This would 
increase the efficiency of the financing process and also reinforce efficiency 
in the real sectors. In credit-purchase and leasing modes of Islamic finance, 
money is not given outright, but rather commodities are given in return for 
debt obligations. Credit expansion in the face of increasing credit-purchase of 
assets and commodities would be tied directly to higher demand for assets 
and commodities, which would have a direct bearing on aggregate supply. 
Consequently, credit finance under Islamic finance would be less inflationary 
in comparison to conventional banking and finance. 
3.1 Behaviour of Credit Markets 
An important part of macro theory relates to the behaviour of credit 
markets. In conventional finance, present money is traded against future 
money either in integrated debt or in bond markets, where huge sums of debt 
are traded daily. Debt markets act as an easy conduit to move short-term 
funds at will from one country to another, more often than not, in reaction to 
factors that are only nebulously related to economic fundamentals. Such 
flows threaten the world economy with the spread of instability that might 
start in one single debt market in a fashion that economists have come to call 
“contagion.” 
In contrast, debt is created in Islamic finance through selling goods and 
services on credit, which by itself is not readily tradable. We can visualize the 
existence of a credit market for each commodity and service in which the 
demand and supply to buy it on credit determines an equilibrium mark-up 
rate. Such credit markets would be fully segmented. There is no room for 
sudden and mass movements of funds. Possibilities of instability and 
contagion would therefore be remote and there would be no pressing need to 
choke capital movements with restrictions.  
Institutional participants in conventional credit markets carry out huge 
speculative transactions which most often turn out to a major source of 
instability. In contrast, Islamic banking and financial institutions are strictly 
prevented from carrying out such gambling activities. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to deduce that destabilizing speculative activity would significantly 
be curtailed in Islamic financial markets. Speculative activities related to 
interest rate expectations would become out of place. Change in spending 
would be reflected directly on change in demands and supplies of goods and 
services, causing quantities of output produced to respond more quickly to 
market forces. 
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3.2 Risk-sharing 
Another important aspect of micro theory is that of risk-sharing. 
Conventional finance can be likened to a spectator’s game where few skilled 
players stay in the playground and a big crowd is watching from outside. 
Islamic finance, meanwhile, is similar to participatory sports, where everyone 
is playing and no one is mere watching. In addition, there is a moral side to 
Islamic finance that seems to be in the back of everyone’s mind. 
Risk is known to be one of the most important ingredients of making 
investment. In Islamic finance, those who finance investment share a good 
part of the risk with those who carry out actual investment activities. 
Conventional finance leaves risk to be borne by specialists and traded among 
them. Banks and financial institutions provide investors with loans 
guaranteed by collateral. In this fashion, they keep themselves shielded from 
certain kinds of risk, like those attached to production, marketing and 
distribution, and limit their exposure to risk related to collateral only. 
Islamic finance allows savers who deposit their funds to share with banks 
the risks associated with choosing the right investment and how successful it 
will be. Banks and financial institutions advancing funds share risk with those 
receiving finance, including producers, traders, and the like. Islamic finance 
with proper corporate governance allows depositors some influence on banks 
investment decisions. The banks and financial institutions can also share the 
decision-making process as their representatives sit on the boards of directors 
of firms receiving funds.  
It, therefore, may be noticed that risk as well as the responsibility for 
decision-making is spread over a much larger number and wider variety of 
concerned people. Risk sharing is balanced by sharing in decision-making. 
This allows for involvement of a wider section of entrepreneur and investors 
in economic activities, so that people will eventually feel they are partners 
rather than spectators.  
The benefit of wider involvement goes beyond the feeling of 
involvement. It adds to the stability of banks. Investment depositors share 
risk indirectly with firms, while relying on banks for monitoring. Having the 
proxy vote of depositors and other investors, Islamic banks, would be 
capable of influencing the corporate governance of firms in a way that 
reduces the risks of failure and promotes profits. In other words, the stability 
of the banking system will reinforce and be reinforced by the stability of the 
real sector. The main results of this would be a higher integrity of the whole 
economic system.13 
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3.3 Equity Considerations 
An important aspect of macro theory is equity. Islamic financial system is 
basically viewed as private profit-seeking business enterprises that operate 
according to the market mechanism. By themselves, they cannot reduce, let 
alone, eradicate poverty. However, if given the right tools, they might 
contribute to the efforts taken by the whole society in that direction.  
Zakah proceeds are known to be earmarked for several uses including 
income and wealth maintenance for the poor. Income maintenance is 
provided within narrow limits to those incapable of working and wealth 
maintenance is provided to the rest of the poor. The latter policy entails 
giving the poor enough productive assets, to make them more productive, 
which in turn contributes to economic development.  
Islamic banks can help by acting as custodians of and participants in the 
disbursement of the zakah proceeds. Government and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) collecting zakah can deposit part of the proceeds 
allocated to the poor in special accounts with Islamic financial institutions, to 
which they may also add a proportion of zakah due on their shareholders’ 
equity14. They might even accept direct payments of zakah and other 
donations on behalf of zakah payer individuals and philanthropic institutions.  
As to income maintenance, Islamic banks can credit the accounts of the 
prescribed poor with monthly payments. Wealth maintenance can be 
implemented through the establishment of micro enterprises that would be 
owned and operated by the poor. While, titles to such enterprises are 
transferred to the poor, certain measures must be taken to insure that the new 
businesses would not be immaturely liquidated to finance consumption 
outlays for their owners. The experience of Islamic banking and financial 
institutions in project financing should come in handy in reducing poverty 
and increasing equity through proper use of zakah proceeds. 
Conventional lending gives utmost attention to the ability to repay loans. 
To ascertain such ability, it depends overwhelmingly on the provisions of 
collateral and guarantees. Thus those already rich would have most access to 
finance. In contrast, Islamic finance providing funds on equity or profit-
sharing basis would be more concerned with profitability and rate of return 
than with collateral and guarantees. In an Islamic financial system those who 
are not wealthy, but have worthy investment projects, may also have 
appropriate access to finance. 
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4. Banking Theory 
Let us first look at the liabilities of Islamic banks of which only demand 
deposits, placed on the basis of profit and loss sharing, are guaranteed. When 
such banks face macroeconomic or bank-specific crises, investment 
depositors automatically share the risk. The bank is less likely to fall bankrupt 
as bank run is least probable. It can, therefore, be said that an Islamic banking 
system is relatively more stable than conventional banking.15 
Banking theory studies finance as a process that runs among three 
parties: a principal, an agent and an intermediary, where both the principal and 
the agent jointly finance a project which is managed by the agent and partly 
financed by the principal.16 The success of the project depends on the agent 
putting a minimum effort. Information asymmetry exists between the agent 
and the principal, and the latter cannot perfectly monitor the former. An 
intermediary performing monitoring on behalf of the principal would 
ameliorate the principal-agent problem.17 
Islamic banking and finance relates to banking theory in two aspects. 
First, Islamic banks perform the function of intermediation between fund 
owners and firms. Banking theory can justify this role in fashion similar to the 
role of commercial banking, which intermediates between borrowers and 
lenders. As monitoring is costly, models containing a costly state-verification 
problem, CSV, conclude that an efficient solution to the monitoring problem 
can be obtained when an agent pools deposits to finance investment 
projects.18 Second, Islamic banks are supposed to practice equity finance 
simultaneously with credit purchase and leasing finance. This implies that 
they are some kind of kin of universal rather than of commercial banks. 
Banking theory comes again to show that such a role brings extra advantages 
to Islamic banking. 
Models that provide rationale for relationship banking postulate a 
positive relationship between the severity of asymmetric information between 
banks and fund users on the one hand and informational distance on the 
other. When conclusions of such models are applied to Islamic banks, if 
unencumbered with constricting regulations, they would tend to build 
relationships in their core markets. Such retrenchment permits them to fend 
off the competitive threat to their captive market. Outside their core segment, 
they offer credit-purchase and leasing finance, which bear some similarity to 
transactional loans. In equilibrium, both forms of relationship and 
transactional finance compete with each other but Islamic banks would be 
expected to specialize in a core market with relationship or universal 
banking.19 
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Islamic banks should, therefore, function as universal banks, which are 
“large-scale banks that operate extensive networks of branches, provide many 
different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and debt), 
and participate directly in the corporate governance of the firms that rely on 
the banks as sources of funding or as securities underwriters.”20  
A bank can be exposed to moral hazard when the firm obtaining finance 
uses the funds for purposes other than those for which finance was 
advanced. This could lead to business failure and inability to repay on part of 
the debtor firm. The bank would be exposed to adverse selection when it fails 
to choose the finance applicants who are most likely to perform. 
Obviously, adverse selection can be avoided by careful screening of 
finance seekers. When a bank provides equity and debt finance 
simultaneously, it will have more access to information than in a situation 
when only debt finance is provided. It could, therefore, be concluded that 
screening would be more effective and adverse selection less probable with 
universal banking. 
Reducing possibilities of moral hazard requires monitoring of the firm 
obtaining finance.21 Equity finance provides the bank with access to 
information necessary to practice continuous monitoring. It also reduces the 
firm incentives to substitute riskier for safer assets. Meanwhile, debt finance 
would reduce the firm incentives to hide its profits. Furthermore, when the 
firm faces problems, the bank, as an equity holder, will assist in order to 
protect its investment.  
In summary, banking theory indicates that Islamic banks should operate 
as universal banks, and when they do, they would be exposed to lower levels 
of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Universal banking has recently attracted much writings from both 
proponents and antagonists.22 Meanwhile, the arguments levelled against it 
created much discussion in the beginning but proved unfounded at the end. 
It has been credited with encouraging industrialization in pre-war Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and Japan. This confirms Gerschenkron’s and Schumpeter’s 
opinions that such form of banking spurs economic growth and helps 
backward countries to catch up with the developed ones.23 This has also been 
confirmed by careful review of historical experience.24  
More recently, Da Rin and Hellmann (2001) have introduced financial 
intermediation into the big push model which has two Pareto-rankable 
equilibria. They showed that universal banks can induce an economy to move 
from low to high equilibrium if they are sufficiently large to invest in a critical 
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mass of firms. The costs of mobilizing the critical mass are reduced, if banks 
are allowed to own equity that allows them a share in the value they help 
create by mobilizing the critical mass. This means that universal banks will 
find it easier to promote investments in new industries. While providing a 
sophisticated analytical framework for the behaviour of universal banking, Da 
Rin and Hellmann’s model is a good step towards building a macro theory of 
banking. 
Universal banks have been accused of altering the corporate capital 
structure in favour of debt and against equity, inefficiently combining banking 
with trade, of concentration to a degree that produces anti-competitive 
behaviour (what came to be known as the organ bank hypothesis). They have 
also been accused of benefiting from the inside information about the firms 
they lend while exercising monopolistic power over access to external 
finance, leading to conflict of interest between banks and other shareholders, 
particularly those who have delegated their voting proxy rights. None of such 
accusations was found credible.25 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be said that Islamic banking and finance as a 
discipline has evolved both theoretically and empirically. It has emerged as a 
lively, provocative and dynamic branch of economics. 
It is not an overstatement to say that it may be interpreted as the dawn of 
the only alternative to the current orthodoxy in banking and finance.  
                                                 
Notes 
1 See the definition of philosophy in Cambridge International Dictionary. 
2 Al-ghabn in transactions implies deception and misrepresentation or cheating. 
3 Al-gharar in transactions implies uncertainty. 
4 Friedman (1969); Cole and Kocherlakota (1998); and Wilson (1979). This result is 
robust in a variety of models, see Correia and Teles, 1997. 
5 Friedman (1969), p. 34 quoted by Ireland (2000). 
6 Wolman (1997). 
7 Uhlig, Harald (2000). 
8 Cole and Kocherlakota (1998); and Ireland (2000). 
9 For alternative ways to overcome the zero-bound interest rate policy, see 
Goodfriend (2000). 
10 Lucas (1994). For an assessment of the welfare cost of implementing a zero rate of 
interest, see Wolman (1997).  
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11 Economists also recommended the application of 100 per cent required reserve 
ratio. However, policymakers have not been impressed, despite the obvious benefits. 
12 Al-Jarhi (1983). 
13 An important area for further research is how to measure the return of overall risk-
sharing in the economy. The approach of Lucas, 1987 and Auffret 2001 would be 
worthwhile in this regard. 
14 Understandably, there may be other expenditure items which would be financed 
from zakah proceeds. That is why only a proportion of them would be handed to 
banks. Such proportion can be determined by society and could change from year to 
year. 
15 Khan (1986). 
16 Ennis (2000). 
17 Holstrom and Tirol (1997). 
18 Diamond (1984). 
19 Hauswald and Marquez (2000). 
20 Calomiris (2000). 
21 Aoki, Masahiko (1994). 
22 For a dialogue between proponents and antagonists, see Fohlin (1998) and Temin 
(1998).  
23 Al-Jarhi (2003). 
24 Da Rin, Marco and Thomas Hellmann (2001). 
25 Fohlin (2000); Barth, Caprio and Levine’s (2000); and Gorton and Schmidt (1996). 
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